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INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we present a straightforward thesis. The chief executive officers of
publicly-held corporations in the United States are losing power. They are losing power to a
board of directors that increasingly consists of both nominally and substantively independent
directors. And, perhaps more so, they are losing power to shareholders. This loss of power is
recent (say, since 2000) and gradual, but nevertheless represents a significant move away from
the imperial CEO who was surrounded by a hand-picked board and lethargic shareholders.
Most significantly, we think that the recent loss of power is not some cyclical change, but
represents some underlying changes in the economic and regulatory landscape that will persist
and result in a further decline of CEO power at least in the intermediate term. What we may be
witnessing is the emergence of a new era of corporate governance for the early part of the 21st
century, where power over the U.S. corporate enterprise is more evenly distributed between
various participants – inside managers, outside directors, and shareholders – rather than
concentrated in the hands of the CEO.
While other’s have noted the CEO’s loss of power,1 this article makes a variety of
contributions. First, relying on the philosophical and sociological analyses of power, we use a
more sophisticated and self conscious conceptual scheme that clarifies the various aspects of
power that are relevant. Second, because CEO power is both conceptually complex and difficult
to observe from outside the firm, we assemble data from a wide variety of sources that provide
both direct and indirect evidence of the decline. Finally, we examine the implications of a

1

Although there have been numerous articles in the trade press on the “decline of the imperial CEO,” see,
e.g., David Leonhardt with Andrew Ross Sorkin, Reining in the Imperial CEO, NYTimes Sept 15, 2002, the focus
has largely been on CEO firings and compensation. While, as we discuss below, both of these are elements of the
decline of CEO power, they are only a piece of a much larger picture.
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decline of CEO power in the large publicly traded US corporation for corporate governance and
control.
The intuition that drives this paper is nicely captured in Milo Winter’s famous 1912
illustration of Gulliver tied down by the Lilliputians.2

Each Lilliputian is far

smaller and weaker than

Gulliver and their ropes, individually, are mere threads. Collectively, and in the aggregate,
however, the threads bind Gulliver.
The article is organized as follows. In Part I, we discuss what we mean by “CEO
power.” In Parts II - VI, we discuss the causes and symptoms for the loss of CEO power. We
2

Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels (Windermere series, New York, Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1936,
c1912, illustrations by Milo Winter, available on line at http://www.jaffebros.com/lee/gulliver/winter/index.html).
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consider shareholder composition and activism (Part II), the actual governance rules and the
board response to shareholder activism (Part III), regulatory changes related to shareholder
voting (Part IV), changes in the board of directors (Part V) and executive compensation (Part
VI). In Part VII, we tie our analysis of the causes and symptoms of loss of CEO power to the
aspects and dimensions of power discussed, and discuss the effects of these changes on CEO
power. In Part VIII, we discuss the implications of our analysis.
Before embarking on our analysis, it is worth recalling just how much power CEOs had
before all the changes that we document here. Myles Mace’s surveys of directors and officers
during the 1960s provide a wonderful window into what it used to be like.3
Consider the following quotes from top executives on the role of the CEO and directors:
•

“To put it bluntly, whether a board has any function or not, it must truly reflect the nature
of the chief executive officer of the company more than anything else. If he wants to use
the board, he will use them. And if he doesn’t want to use the board, he will run over
them pretty roughshod. Basically, the board can be made just about as useful as the
president wishes it to be.”4

•

“The president of a company, or the chairman of the board, or whoever runs this
operation, really determines the contribution the board makes. If all he wants to do is to
get up in front of them and sort of go through some motions, see that fees get distributed,
give them a bit of lunch – then that’s the kind of performance you will get, because the

3

Myles Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality (1971).

4

Mace at 78.

3

chief executive officer controls the affair. If, on the other hand, the chief executive
officer seeks out where in the management ares various board members might be able to
make more of a contribution than in others, and then structures his board so that emphasis
is placed on such questions rather than on the rote alternative, then chief executive is
making a direct impact on the contribution the board makes. This, I suppose, is a matter
of style.”5
•

“What any new board member finds out very quickly in our company is that it is very
difficult to do anything except go along with the recommendations of the president.
Because directors who doin’t go along with them tend to find themselves asked to
leave.”6

•

“The old man [the president] has exactly the kind of a board he wants. They all live here
in the city, and they just don’t do a damn thing as directors. The old man thinks it is a
great board, and from his point of view he is porbably right. From my point of view they
are a big glob of nothing. Not that there aren’t some extremely able outsiders on the
board – there are. But as board members, they know who is in control and they will
never cross the old man.”7

These interviews led Mace to conclude that “Presidents of these [widely held] companies have
assumed and do exercise the de facto powers of control of the companies for which they are

5

Mace at 78.

6

Mace at 79.
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Mace at 79. Mace then comments: “This point of view was confirmed many times during our study.” Id.

4

responsible. To them the stockholders constitute what is in effect an anonymous mass of paper
faces. Thus, presidents in these situations determine what directors do or do not do. . . . Most
presidents, it was found, choose to exercise their powers of control in a moderate and acceptable
manner with regard to their relationships with boards of directors. They communicate, though,
explicitly or implicitly, that they, as presidents, control the enterprises they head, and this is
generally understood and accepted by the directors. Many of them are presidents of companies
themselves, and they thoroughly understand the existence oand location of powers of control.”

I.

POWER AND THE CEO
A.

What is CEO Power?

Power is a complex concept that has generated, and continues to generate, a huge
literature. Drawing on that literature, in speaking of CEO power, we are interested in three
related aspects of power: decision making, second-guessing, and scope.8
Decision making refers to the ability of the CEO to decide key issues facing the firm
either on her own or by getting the pro forma approval by other decision-makers in the firm,
such as shareholders, the board of directors, or lower-level managers. A greater ability to decide
means more CEO power. Decision making ability, in turn, has several facets. First, CEO power
includes the CEO’s ability to control whether an issue is even presented to other potential

8

There is a huge literature on “power” in Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science. Important
contributions include Robert Dahl, Who Governs (2d edition 2005); Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (2d ed.
2005), Dennis Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses (2004); and Peter Morriss, Power: A Philosophical
Analysis (2d ed. 2002). Because our interest is essentially practical and comparative – are CEOs less powerful than
they used to be? – we do not need to come up with a comprehensive analysis of power. Rather, it is enough to
identify a set of features that approximate the recognized scope of the term “power” in corporate law and
governance. We assert without proving that these aspects capture the essential elements of “CEO power” including
the various aspects of “power to” and “power over” as well as the related notions of “autonomy.”
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decision-makers, i.e. the power of the CEO to control the agenda of these other decision-making
bodies. Second, it includes the ability of the CEO to determine the outcome of an issue that is
presented to these other bodies, i.e. the power to determine the decision outcome. Third, the
ability of the CEO to act if the issue is not presented to these other bodies, i.e. the power to act
independently. CEOs have the greatest power if they either (i) have both agenda control and the
power to act independently or (ii) they have the power to determine the decision outcome.
Second guessing refers to the ability of other actors to second guess, and penalize, the
CEO for a decision. A lesser ability to second guess by other actors means more CEO power.
Second guessing, unlike decision making, thus relates not to the ability to make a decision to
start with, but to the consequences if other actors, at the time or with the benefit of hindsight,
disagree with a decision that has already been made.
Finally, scope relates to the type of decisions that a CEO has the power to make. Scope,
in turn, has three dimensions: extension, comprehensiveness, and intensity. Extension relates to
the scale of the firm: Given the CEO’s power within a firm, a CEO of a larger firm is more
powerful than a CEO of a smaller firm. Comprehensiveness relates to the type of decisions over
which a CEO has power. For example, can the CEO set the price of a product sold by the firm,
the price of a division that the company wants to put up for sale, or the price at which the whole
firm is to be sold to a third party? The more comprehensive the type of decisions, the more
powerful is the CEO. Finally, intensity relates to how far can the CEO push others without loss
of compliance. A CEO may, for example, have the power to set the price for a product, a
division, or the whole firm as long as the price is within the range of reasonable prices, but may
not be able to get away with setting a ridiculously low price.

6

Each of these aspects of “power” captures a different facet of what we take people to
mean when they talk of “CEO power.” As we’ll show in the discussion below, the CEO’s
“power” has changed over some of these dimensions more than others. In particular, we will
argue that CEOs has lost decision making power, in terms of agenda control, outcome
manipulation, and the power to make decisions independently, albeit in different degrees and to
different other decision-making bodies. CEOs have also become more subject to secondguessing, both by shareholders and board members. In terms of scope, CEOs have suffered a
decline of power along the dimensions of comprehensiveness and intensity, though not
extension.
In addition to its conceptual complexity, power is also a complex social phenomenon that
emerges at the intersection of law, norms and personal qualities such as charisma. The
accumulation and exercise of power often occur below the surface, giving rise to an “iceberg”
problem: what we observe is likely to be only a small part of what is taking place.
Moreover, in examining changes in power, sorting out cause and effect is likewise
extremely difficult both conceptually and analytically. For example, is increased shareholder
power evidence of a decline in CEO power, a cause of it, or an effect of it? How about the
emergence of more independent boards? The answer, in these and other situations, is often, but
not always, “all of the above.”
These complications make our analysis somewhat speculative. Maybe we are completely
wrong that CEO power has declined. Maybe CEOs are every bit as powerful as they once were.
Maybe they were never very powerful. Or maybe it is impossible to come up with a metric for
measuring CEO power or, even if one can design a metric, to collect the data to determine

7

whether CEO power has declined. On the other hand, we think that there are lots of reasons to
think that one can intelligibly discuss CEO power, that it has declined, and that this decline in
CEO power has important implications. That is the case we make in this article.

II. CHANGES IN SHAREHOLDER COMPOSITION AND ACTIVISM
The profile and behavior of shareholders has been fundamentally transformed in recent
decades. These changes in shareholder composition and activism have reduced CEO power.
1. The Never-Ending Rise of Institutional Investors
Commentators have long noted the change in the ownership structure of shares of
publicly-traded corporations. In an article published in 1990, for example, Bernie Black
presented data showing that the percentage of institutional ownership in New York Stock
Exchange companies, which tend to be the largest publicly held companies, had increased from
45.2% in 1980 to 54.4% in 1988.9 Around the same period, several other articles noted the
increase in institutional ownership and the commensurate decline in individual ownership of
shares and argued that the concentrated ownership by institutions would be the dawn of a new
era of shareholder power.10 As we have remarked elsewhere, although shareholder power has

9

Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520, 570 (1990). In examining
the different measures of concentration of shareholding discussed in the text, it is worth remembering that different
studies study different samples and may define terms differently. The most important results are the trends within a
sample.
10

Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 811 (1991); Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990); Mark J. Roe, A Political
Theory on American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991). But see, e.g. Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1990);
Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445
(1991); see also Anat R. Admati et al., Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market
Equilibrium. 102 J. Pol. Econ. 1097 (1994) (developing model of large shareholder monitoring).
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increased somewhat over the last 20 years, the hopes of these commentators have been largely
unfulfilled – until recently, that is.11
Probably as a result of the spate of scholarship from the early 1990s, the fact that
ownership by institutions has increased has long been treated as yesterdays news. There are,
however, two noteworthy developments about the ownership by institutions since 1990.
First, the increase in ownership by institutions and the decline in ownership by
individuals has continued since 1990 at virtually the same rate. As shown in Table 1, the
percentage of stock of publicly held companies help by all institutions (pension funds, mutual
funds, banks, insurance companies, and broker/dealers) increased from 8% in 1950, to 19% in
1970, to 37% in 1990, to 60% in 2006.12 Ownership by “households”13 has decreased from 90%
in 1950 to 78%% in 1970 to 56% in 1990 to 27% in 2006. If the increase in ownership by
institutions from 19% in 1970 to 37% in 1990 was an important phenomenon to commentators
from that period, the further increase to 60-70% is presumably also important. Furthermore, the
fact that the rate of increase has not budged – in fact, aggregate ownership by institutions has
increased every single year since 2000 – means that the day is not far when dispersed individual
investors will own only a trivial fraction of equities.14 The 90-10% ratio of retail to institutional

11

Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Funds and Corporate Governance and Control, 155 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1021 (2007).
12

Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States [hereinafter
Flow of Funds Accounts], various years.
13

The federal reserve treats households as the residual category which thus includes any shares not
attributed to other categories. See Guide to the Flow of Funds Accounts. Besides the institutions noted above and
household, the federal reserve provides data for ownership by state and local governments and foreign residents.
14

Note that household ownership also includes holdings by individual blockholders.
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stock ownership of the 1950s could soon become 90-10 the other way.15 Brian Cartwright, the
general counsel at the SEC, has recently referred to this as “deretailization” and has argued that
the disappearance of individual (i.e., non-institutional) ownership “will have, and already is
having, profound consequences.”16
More important than the overall increase in institutional holdings is the composition of
that ownership. Pre-1990, the most important type of institutional owners were private pension
funds. Ownership by private pension funds had increased from 1% in 1950 to 8% in 1970 to
17% in 1990. By contrast, ownership by mutual funds and public pension funds had increased at
a slower pace, from 3% in 1950 to 5% in 1970 to 7% in 1990 for mutual funds and from less
than 1% in 1950 to 1% in 1970 to 8% in 1990.17 But even in 1990, commentators recognized
that private pension funds were among the least likely institutions to take an activist approach
and private funds have indeed not been active.18
Since 1990, the picture has changed drastically. Holdings by private pension funds have
declined from 17% in 1990 to 13% in 2006, and given the problems with defined benefit plans,
they are poised for further declines. Mutual funds, by contrast, have taken off, quadrupling their
percentage holdings from 7% to 28%.19 And mutual funds, as discussed below, have recently

15

Brian Cartwright, The Future of Securities Regulation, University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute
for Law and Economics Distinguished Jurist Lecture, October 24, 2007, available at
http://sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407bgc.htm.
16

Cartwright, supra note XX.

17

Flow of Funds Accounts, supra note XX, various years.

18

Black, Shareholder passivity, supra note XX, at 596-598.

19

Flow of Funds Accounts, supra note XX, various years.
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become increasingly engaged in governance activism.20

2. Hedge Funds: The New Player
As we have discussed in an earlier paper, activist hedge funds have recently emerged as
critical new players in both corporate governance and corporate control. Hedge funds have
created headaches for CEOs and corporate boards by pushing for changes in management and
changes in business strategy including opposing acquisitions favored by management both as
shareholders of the acquirer and as shareholders of the target, and by making unsolicited bids.21
The list of companies that have been subjected to campaigns by hedge funds and other activist
investors include McDonalds, Time-Warner, H.J. Heinz, Wendy’s, Massey Energy, KT&G,
infoUSA, GenCorp; Sovereign Bancorp, Deutsche Boerse; Novartis, Sears Holdings, VNU,
Delphi, Calpine, Kerr-McGee, Blockbuster, Hollinger International22, Target23, Kraft24, Home

20

See infra XX.

21

See Kahan & Rock, supra note XX.

22

See Kahan & Rock, supra note XX, at 1024-42.

23

Wall St. J., July 17, 2007, at C3.

24

Kraft in deal with Peltz's Trian, Reuters, Nov. 8, 2007, at
http://www.reuters.com/article/innovationNews/idUSN0757299320071108.
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Depot,25 WCI,26 Motorola,27 Biogen,28 Comcast,29 H&R Block,30 Tiffany,31 Alcoa32, BEA
Systems,33 CSX,34 Circuit City,35 Zale Jewelers,36 CSX,37 the New York Times,38 and SprintNextel.39 According to Wachtell, Lipton partner Patricia Vlahakis, hedge funds conducted 137
activist campaign just in the fourth quarter of 2007.40 In many of these instances, hedge funds

25

Home Depot Draws Proxy Threat from Investor, Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 2006, at A10 (Relational Investors)

26

Icahn, WCI Management Trade Barbs at Hint of Hostile Bid; Shares Jump
by: SA Editor Jonathan Liss, Seeking Alpha, Mar. 14, 2007, at
http://seekingalpha.com/article/29487-icahn-wci-management-trade-barbs-at-hint-of-hostile-bid-shares-jump.
27

Motorola Reaches Truce with Icahn, Wall St. J., April 8, 2008, at B3 (Icahn)

28

Biogen Considers a Sale; Pressure Comes from Icahn, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 2007, at A3.

29

Comcast Holder Seeks CEO’s Dismissal, Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 2008 at A8 (Chieftain Capital
Management)
30

Wall St. J., September 7, 2007, at C3

31

Tiffany Will Hear Ideas of Peltz Funds, New Tork Times, Feb. 27, 2007, at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9503EED91E3EF934A15751C0A9619C8B63.
32

Alcoa: JANA Partners LLC calls on Alcoa's Board to drop Alcan bid and pursue strategic alternatives
including a sale of the company, Reuters, May 8, 2007at
http://www.reuters.com/article/inPlayBriefing/idUSIN20070508142830AA20070508.
33

Activists test Silicon Valley, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 2007, at B1 (Icahn)

34

En Garde, Activist hedge Funds, Wall St. J. [online?], Mar. 24, 2008 (3G Capital and TCF])

35

Activists Circle Circuit City, Wall St. J., Mar 24, 2008, at C2 (Wattles, HBK and D.E. Shaw)

36

Breeden continues building stake in jeweler Zale, Reuters, Jan. 7, 2008, at
http://www.reuters.com/article/consumerproducts-SP/idUSN0740372120080108.
37

Hedge Funds Propose CSX Directors, Starting proxy Battle, NYT, Dec. 20, 2007 (Children’s and 3G).

38

See, e.g., New York Times Holder protest Grows, Wall St. J., Apr. 25, 2007, at B10.

39

Sprint Nextel Announces Appointment of Ralph Whitworth to Its Board of Directors, Reuters, Feb. 12,
2008, at http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS145208+12-Feb-2008+BW20080212 (appointment of
head of Relational Investors to company board).
40

Corporate Law Daily, Hedge Fund Activism, Possible Recession Will Play Roles in Upcoming Proxy
Season, Feb. 1, 2008.
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have been able to win outright or at least to wrest substantial concessions from the management
of the companies they target.
This new activism by hedge funds has become a prime irritant for CEOs. Martin Lipton,
the renowned advisor to corporate boards, last year listed attacks by activist hedge funds “as the
number one key issue for directors.”41 Alan Murray from the Wall Street Journal calls hedge
funds the “new leader” on the “list of bogeymen haunting the corporate boardroom”42 and his
colleague Jesse Eisinger notes that these days, hedge funds are the “shareholder activists with the
most clout.”43
What is particularly noteworthy is the degree of activist bang generated by relatively
little buck. Although hedge funds manage approximately $1.7 trillion of investor money, the
large majority of hedge funds do not pursue activist strategies. Rather, according to a recent
estimate by J.P. Morgan, only 5% of hedge fund assets are available for shareholder activism.44
Given these figures, the list of companies targeted by hedge funds is indeed impressive.

3. Activism by Traditional Institutions
Traditional institutional investors – specifically public pension funds and mutual funds –

41

Martin Lipton, Wachtell Lipton, Rosen & Katz Client Memo, Dec. 1, 2005; see also Martin Lipton at al.,
Wachtell Lipton, Rosen & Katz Client Memo, Being prepared for Attacks by Activist Hedge Funds, Dec. 21, 2005
(noting “environment of increased attacks by hedge funds” and advising companies how to deal with it); Martin
Lipton at al., Wachtell Lipton, Rosen & Katz Client Memo, Attacks by Activist Hedge Funds, Mar. 7, 2006
(presenting checklist for clients to deal with activist hedge funds).
42

Alan Murray, Hedge Funds Are New Sheriffs of Boardroom, Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 2005, at A2.

43

Jesse Eisinger, Memo to Activists: Mind CEO Pay, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 2006, at C1 (“The shareholder
activists with the most clout these days are hedge-fund managers …”).
44

Kahan & Rock, supra note XX.
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have long engaged in low pressure (and low cost) “soft” forms of activism, such as voting in
favor of corporate governance shareholder resolutions (and occasionally introducing them) or
lobbying boards behind-the-scenes to improve their corporate governance.45 As discuss below,
the corporate governance issues “du jour” to which this activism is directed are constantly
evolving and the level of support for shareholder resolutions has increased. Overall, however,
there has been no major qualitative change in the nature of the soft activism by traditional
institutions.
A.

The Awakening of Mutual Funds

On different fronts, however, qualitative changes seem to be occurring. First, mutual
funds are increasingly engaging in the hard-core activism that has until recently been the
hallmark of hedge funds. For example, mutual funds have shown an increased willingness to
oppose acquisition of their portfolio companies by private equity firms or large family owners.46
In the first half of 2007 alone, mutual funds successfully opposed a number of buy-out
transactions approved by the board of directors. Most prominently, the mutual fund giant
Fidelity, the largest shareholder of Clear Channel Communications, threatened to vote against an
acquisition of the company by Bain Capital Partners and Thomas H. Lee Partners, two private
equity firms, for $37.60 per share. The deal was strongly supported by the company’s CEO (and

45

Kahan & Rock, supra note XX.

46

Research Spotlight, Investor Activism against Mergers on the Rise, March 7, 2007; OSI Buyout Down
but Not Out, St. Petersburgh Times, May 9, 2007, “One reason for the trend is that hedge funds and even traditional
mutual fund companies have become tougher, and more vocal, critics of deals they don't like, said Chris Young,
Institutional Shareholder Services' director of mergers-and-acquisitions research.”) Tom Lauricella, Oppenheimer
Revolt Shows Mutual Funds' New Mood, Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2007 (“Borrowing a tactic from hedge funds
and other aggressive investors, mutual funds are showing new willingness to publicly battle with companies they
own.”); Tom Lauricella, Mutual Funds Get Mad, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 2007, at R1.
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member of the founding family) Mark Mays – who stood to receive options on up to 2.5% of the
stock of the company. But as a result of the opposition of Fidelity and other shareholders, the
buyers were forced to increase the price to $39.20.47
Similarly, T. Rowe Price, an 8.1% stockholder, lead the opposition to the proposed
acquisition of Laureate Education for $60.50. The offer was sweetened to $62.48 Mutual fund
Lord Abbett & Co., the second-largest shareholder (6.95 percent) of OSI Restaurant Partners,
complained about the $40-per-share buyout price as having the “makings of a ‘panic sale.’"49
Shareholders initially failed to approve the deal, and only voted for it after Bain Capital
increased the price to $41.15.50 Investment manager Pzena Investment Management, the secondlargest shareholder of Lear, opposed Carl Icahn’s offer for the company, first forcing him to raise
his price from $36.25 to $37.2551 and eventually killing the deal.52 And the public pension fund
CalPERS opposed a $44 buyout of Biomet Inc. by a group of private equity firms. When it
appeared that the buyout would not receive the requisite shareholder approval, the offer was

47
Zachery Kouwe, Back in Play Shareholder Outcry Revives Clear Channel LBO, N.Y. Post, May 8, 2007,
at http://www.nypost.com/seven/05082007/business/back_in_play_business_zachery_kouwe.htm.
48

Laureate Education Accepts $3.82B Buyout Bid, June 5, 2007 at
http://www.wtop.com/?nid=25&sid=1157803; Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 2007 at R21.
49

OSI Buyout Down but not out, St. Petersburgh Times, May 9, 2007; see also OSI Restaurant Agrees to
Bain's Higher Buyout Offer (Update7) at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=afMhnHr6MVX8&refer=home
50

See also Ann Carrns, Putnam Cites Price in Plan to Vote Against WaMu’s Providian Deal, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 2. 2005, at C3 (quoting bank analyst as describing public opposition by a mutual fund to acquisition as “a little
bit unusual”).
51

Icahn's Lear Bid Not Enough, Pzena Says, Forbes.com, July 9, 2007 at
http://www.forbes.com/markets/2007/07/09/lear-icahn-update-markets-equity-cx_af_0709markets20.html.
52

Lear shareholders reject Icahn's takeover bid, Int’l Herald Tribune, July 17, 2007, at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/07/17/business/lear.php.
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raised to $46.53 In all of these cases, the offer that the institutional investors considered too low
– and that was subsequently raised – had the blessing of the respective company’s board of
directors and its CEO.
The new hard-core activism by traditional money managers is not confined to the buyout
area. The money management arm of the investment bank Morgan Stanley has urged the New
York Times Co. to dismantle its dual share structure, which assures the founding Sulzberger
family of continued control of the company.54 A campaign lead by Morgan Stanley – and
supported by mutual funds T. Rowe Price and Legg Mason55 – for shareholders to withhold their
votes from nominees to the board of directors resulted in an 42% withhold vote, which amounted
to a majority of the votes not controlled by the Sulzberger family.56 Recently, Morgan Stanley
hired a governance expert respected in activist circles, which fueled speculation that Morgan
Stanley may itself be planning to engage in more activism.57
A related noteworthy – and novel – phenomenon is the cooperation between mutual
funds and hedge funds in pressuring management.58 For example, in March 2007, Oppenheimer
Funds teamed up with several hedge funds to stage a coup and install new top executives at

53

Wall St. J., June 8, 2007, at C3.

54

How a Money Manager Battled the New York Times, Wall St. J., mar. 21, 2007, at A1.

55

New York Times Holder Protest Grows, Wall St. J., Apr. 25, 2007, at B10.

56
Shareholders Withhold Votes for Times Directors, Apr. 25, 2007, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/25/business/25times.web.html?ex=1335153600&en=350cddc251fdfb59&ei=5090
&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss
57

Morgan Stanley Buffs activist Profile, Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 2006, at C15.

58

See generally ISS, 2006 Postseason Survey at 25 (noting that asset managers who used to work behind
the scenes are increasingly joining hedge funds in opposing management).
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Take-Two Interactive Software Inc., the struggling maker of the popular videogame series Grand
Theft Auto. According to the Wall Street Journal, this was “the first time in [Oppenheimer’s]
46-year history to take such a step.”59 Other recent instances of cooperation between mutual
funds and hedge funds include joint efforts to block the acquisition of the London Stock
Exchange by Deutsche Bank, of Chiron by Novartis, of MONY by AXA, of Lear by Carl
Icahn,60 and of IMS Health by VNU; joint bids for Beverly Enterprises;61 and a joint proxy fight
over Time Warner.62 Often, as in the case of Deutsche Bank, it is activist hedge funds who take
the lead and mutual funds who follow. But increasingly, as in the case of Oppenheimer, mutual
funds are in the forefront.63
B.

Institutional Investor Support of Activist Hedge Funds

Even when institutional investors do not directly engage in hard core activism, their
willingness to invest in activist hedge funds provides the capital that makes it possible. There
are two models for this division of responsibility. The rare but most transparent approach is
illustrated by Hermes, the British Telecom owned fund manager which “manages the assets of
the BT Scheme and the Post Office Staff Superannuation Scheme, two of the largest four pension

59

Tom Lauricella, Oppenheimer Revolt Shows Mutual Funds' New Mood, Wall Street Journal, April 11,

2007.
60

Lear Accepts Carl Icahn's $2.8 Billion Cash Offer (Update9), Feb. 9, 2007, at
http://www.bloomsberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&refer=home&sid=alWGZxoz9GxU (noting opposition to
Icahn’s offer bu Pzena (a hedge fund) and Brandes (a mutual fund).
61

Kahan & Rock, supra note XX.
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ISS 2006 survey [find better cite] (Icahn, SCA, Jana and Franklin Mutual).
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Take-Two Dissidents Win Control, Install New Chief (Update2) at
http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&src=mwm&sid=agdRA1p8Epzc (“Dissident investors led by
OppenheimerFunds Inc. won control of Take-Two Interactive Software Inc.”).
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funds in the U.K.,”64 In 1998, Hermes established an independent fund, the Hermes UK Focus

Fund, which has successfully pursued activist strategies.65 When an activist hedge fund sits on
top of, or beside, an index fund, it can be thought of as providing the activist corporate
governance strike force for the associated index fund.
The more common model involves investments by institutional investors in activist hedge
funds. Functionally, this is quite similar to the Hermes model: institutions who invest in
independent activist funds that target underperforming companies can make money on their
direct investments and may also increase the value of their portfolio overall. On the other hand,
indirect investment provides the institutions with a great deal more insulation from criticism.
When institutional investors invest in activist hedge funds – and they do – their identity is
typically confidential. From the funds’ side, this is valuable: it prevents competitors from
soliciting their investors. For the institutions, it allows them to encourage and facilitate activism
with plausible deniability. It is easier and cleaner for the Harvard or Yale endowments or
CalPERS or NYCERS to invest in an activist hedge fund than to take the responsibility of
starting and operating one themselves, on the Hermes model.66

4. The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms
Proxy advisory firms have arisen in parallel with the increased share ownership by
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Becht, Marco, Franks, Julian R., Mayer, Colin and Rossi, Stefano, "Returns to Shareholder Activism:
Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund" (April 2008). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No.
138/2006 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=934712 at p. 13.
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18

institutional investors. Such firms make recommendation to their clients – which include most
institutional investors – on how to vote their shares in the election of directors, shareholder
resolutions, merger proposals, or any other matter on which shareholders vote, as well as
providing services that simplify the casting of votes. Commentators describe RiskMetrics
(formerly Institutional Shareholder Services and the largest advisory firm) as exercising
“tremendous clout”,67 wielding “extraordinary” influence,68 being “belligerent”69 and to which
“powerful CEOs come on bended knees.”70 Claims about its power range from swaying 18% of
the votes,71 to 20-25%72, to 30%,73 to affecting the vote of $25 trillion in assets,74 to getting
“whatever [it] wants.”75 Martin Lipton blames “influential proxy advisory firms”, together with
hedge funds and other activist shareholders, for undermining the board-centric model of
governance.76 (For the growth in similar references to RiskMetrics/ISS or Glass Lewis over time,
see Figure 1).
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While many of the claims are likely to be exaggerated,77 proxy advisors are important in
at least two ways. First, they may be new and independent power centers that, to some
significant degree, influence the votes of clients. Second, they may function as central
coordinating and information agents who help create a unified front of institutional investors,
and thereby increase collective institutional shareholder influence.

III. CHANGE IN GOVERNANCE RULES AND BOARD’S RESPONSE TO ACTIVISM
In recent years, the governance structure of large publicly held corporations has been
transformed through a combination of regulatory changes and shareholder activism. These
changes – which diminish the power of the CEO – are both a cause of, and a reflection of, a
decline in CEO power.
1. The Demise of Staggered Boards
Modern corporate law scholarship regards staggered boards as one of the most potent and
controversial anti-takeover devices.78 In companies with so-called “effective” staggered boards,
it takes two consecutive annual shareholder meetings to replace a majority of a board of directors
against the opposition of incumbents. While poison pills that are not coupled with staggered
boards are nowadays viewed as relatively harmless, several commentators have argued that
staggered boards, coupled with the (virtually) universally available poison pill, illegitimately
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Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch, & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Influence of Proxy Advisors,
working paper 2008.
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See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy," 54 Stanford Law Review 887-951 (2002);
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serve to entrench managers and that courts should find some way to render them ineffective.79
The policy battlefront for takeover defenses, in other words, has shifted to staggered boards.
For existing companies, conventional wisdom has had it that shareholders and boards are
in a stalemate. Boards of companies without staggered boards may want to adopt staggered
boards, but they do not propose a charter amendment because they know that shareholders will
not approve it. Shareholders in companies with staggered boards want to get rid of them, but
cannot because the board refuses to approve the requisite charter amendment.80
The conventional wisdom is wrong. The tide on staggered boards has turned and, at least
for the largest companies, the day is not far off when staggered boards will be extinct. In Table
2, we present data on staggered boards in the S&P 100 companies. S&P 100 companies are the
largest and among the most established companies. In aggregate, they represent almost 45% of
the market capitalization in the U.S.81 As Table 2 shows, the incidence of staggered boards has
declined from 44% to 16% between 2003 and 2008.82
To be sure, the decline of staggered boards among the largest and most established
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Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered
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companies does not necessarily mean that staggered boards are universally in decline. Arguably
the managers of the largest companies are least in need of insulation against takeovers, and thus
most willing to agree to destagger. Indeed, staggered boards are alive and well in companies at
the time of their IPO. In a sample of 26 companies that went public in the first part of 2007, we
found that 20 had staggered boards provisions in their charters.
That said, the largest and most established companies act as trend-setters for what is
considered good corporate governance. The directors of these companies sit on boards of
smaller companies, and their managers are members of influential groups like the Business
Roundtable. With two-thirds of these companies dismantling their staggered boards or putting
them for a shareholder vote in the last 5 years, it will become increasingly difficult for other
companies to resist shareholder pressure.
In fact, smaller companies have started to go down the same path of dismantling their
staggered boards that the S&P 100 companies have almost completed. Thus, according to
SharkRepellent, the incidence of staggered boards among the (still large) S&P 500 companies
has declined from 57% in 2003 to 47% in 2005 to 36% in 2007; among mid-size S&P 400
companies, it declined from 67% in 2003 to 64% in 2005 to 58% in 2007; and among small S&P
600 companies, it declined from 61% in 2003 to 60% in 2005 to 55% in 2007.83 Thus, we
suggest that other companies are already and will increasingly follow the lead of the S&P 100
companies.

2. The Meteoric Rise of Majority Voting for Directors
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See SharkRepellent.net - Library.
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Perhaps the most astonishing change in the corporate governance environment is the
meteoric rise of majority voting for directors. The traditional voting standard for director
elections is plurality voting. Under plurality voting, the directors who receive the most votes are
elected. This means, in effect, that if the number of nominees is equal to the number of
vacancies – as is the case in the overwhelming majority of director elections – every nominee is
assured election since it takes only one vote to be elected.
Until recently, the directors of most corporations were elected under a plurality voting
regime. Of S&P 100 companies, only 10 deviated from plurality voting in 2003.84 By 2007, that
number had increased to 82. (See Table 3.) Moreover, of the 18 remaining companies, 3 had
charter amendments to adopt majority voting in their 2007 proxy statements (all of which
passed), 5 had some form of cumulative or dual class voting regime in place which complicates
majority voting for directors,85 and 3 had been, or were in the process of being, acquired and did
not file a 2007 proxy statement. Only 7 companies retained a regular plurality voting regime.
Thus, within a span of 4 years, we have moved from a regime in which majority voting was the
rare exception to a regime in which it is the overwhelming norm. Though the rise of majority
voting among the broader set of S&P 500 companies has been somewhat slower,86 experienced
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Two as a result of state law, 5 due to charter or bylaw provisions, 2 unclear why, 1 unclear whether.
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See Claudia H. Allen, Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections, Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg, LLP,
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to 66%).
Companies that have adopted majority voting differ in whether they have done so through a by-law
amendment which usually specifies that a director who receives more “withhold” or “against” votes than “for” votes
is not elected or through corporate governance guidelines requiring a director to tender her resignation is she
receives more “withhold” or “against” votes than “for” votes. (Delaware law was recently changed to clarify that a
resignation conditional on not receiving a specified vote can provide that it is irrevocable. See DGCL, Section
141(b).) The distinction between these two variants, however, is not large. Even if the director is not elected, the
remaining board members could if they wanted to fill the resulting vacancy with the very director who failed to
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observers like Martin Lipton opined that “it is clear today that majority voting will become
universal.”87
Two further comments are in order to put this shift in perspective. First, it is important to
highlight that boards just caved to demands for majority voting. Unlike the shift from staggered
boards to annual election, the more dramatic shift from plurality to majority voting was not
preceded by a long and tortured shareholder campaign, happened over a short time span, and was
more complete. Second, the shift to majority voting makes the shift from staggered boards all
the more important. To the extent that majority voting provides a tool for shareholders to show
their disapproval for specific directors, rather than the board or management as a whole, annual
voting means that they have the opportunity to do so, for each director, on a yearly basis. Thus,
while staggered boards have hitherto been viewed largely as an anti-takeover device, they now
are also important as a mechanism to insulate board members from shareholder “withhold”
campaigns. And the demise of staggered boards documented in the previous sections means that
the ability to exert pressure via “withhold” campaigns is increasing.

3. More – and More Successful – Shareholder Proposals
Another piece of evidence suggesting that the landscape is changing relates to precatory
shareholder resolutions. In precatory resolutions, shareholders request the board of directors to
take a certain action – such as redeem a pill or propose a charter amendment – without

receive the requisite shareholder vote. Directors, of course, will be reluctant to do so, but they will be equally
reluctant not to accept the resignation of a director who received more “against” than “for” votes. In any case, most
recent moves to majority voting are via by-law amendments and many companies that had initially adopted a
corporate governance guidelines and subsequently adopted a by-law. See Allen, supra note XX.
87

Martin Lipton, Some Thoughts ... 2008, infra.
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mandating the action. Virtually all these resolutions are introduced under Rule 14a-8 of the
Securities Exchange Act which permits shareholders, at little cost, to force the company to
include a resolution in its own materials. Precatory resolutions thus represent a low cost and
(since they are not binding) relatively low pressure form of activism.
In addition, it was long thought that precatory shareholder resolutions did not have much
of an effect. This used to be true – but no longer is. First, an increasing number of shareholder
resolutions are adopted by shareholders.88 Since 2001, Georgeson, a major proxy solicitor, has
prepared an annual Corporate Governance Review showing the voting results on shareholder
resolutions filed with S&P 1500 companies.89 Table 4 shows, for each year, the number of
proposals receiving majority shareholder support and whether the board, in the year after
passage, implemented the proposal (i.e., did what the shareholders asked it to do), ignored the
proposal (i.e., refused to do what the shareholders asked it to do), or did neither (e.g., because the
company was acquired or because the proposal asked the board to refrain from taking an action
which the board ordinarily would not have taken anyway within that time frame).90
Since 2001, the number of implemented proposals has been rising steadily, from 3 to 46
proposals. This is partly due to an increase in the number of proposals receiving majority
support, but to a greater degree to an increase in the percentage of implemented proposals, from
12% in 2001 to 63% in 2006. Correspondingly, the percentage of ignored proposals has
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declined. Thus, in 2001, few proposals were adopted and most of those that were adopted were
simply ignored by the board of directors. By 2006, many more proposals were adopted and, of
those, most were implemented.91

IV. REGULATORY CHANGES - VOTING AND SOLICITATION OF PROXIES
A generation of efforts to empower shareholders has led to a series of regulatory changes. An
account of the constraints placed on CEOs is not complete with discussing them.
1.

The 1992 Amendments: An Honorable Mention

The 1992 amendments to the proxy rules merit an honorable mention in this section.92
To understand the import of this and some later reforms, it is important to give a short overview
of the federal regulation of proxy solicitations.
The federal proxy rules used to prohibit any person from engaging in a solicitation unless
that person has filed a proxy statement with the SEC and sent it to each shareholder who is being
solicited or an exception applies. The definition of “solicitation” in the proxy rules, moreover,
was (and still is) extraordinarily broad and includes virtually any comment about the company,
management, or any proposal to be voted.93 Preparing a proxy statement is a somewhat tedious
and costly task, and printing and mailing it to each solicited shareholder further adds to the
expense. If a shareholder owns only a few percent of a company’s stock, if the issue involved is
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For another study on shareholder resolutions arriving at similar conclusions, see Randall S. Thomas &
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not of critical importance, or if the shareholder is not planning to conduct a full-fledged
campaign, the shareholder is not likely to engage in any solicitation unless an exception to the
proxy statement filing requirement applies.94 The natural effect of these rules was thus to stifle
communication and coordination among shareholders.
The 1992 amendments added an additional important exception to the requirement to
prepare and file a proxy statement. Under Rule 14a-2(b)(1), most persons who do not either
“seek ... the power to act as proxy” or furnish a form of proxy need not file a proxy statement.95
When the solicitation is oral, no filings of any sort are required.96 This exception is useful when
the solicited shareholders can vote on the form of proxy distributed by the company – such as
votes in favor of a shareholder resolution, in opposition to a management proposal, or to
withhold authority to vote for certain directors.
Rule 14a-2(b)(i) was mostly meant on encourage involvement by institutional investors.
However, until recently, it does not appear that institutional investors – or anyone else, for that
matter – made much use of the exceptions in the rules. Active campaigns in favor of a
shareholders proposal, in opposition to a management proposal, or to withhold directors were
rare until 2004.97
More recently, however, the exceptions in Rule 14a-2(b)(i) have become much more
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important. As discussed above, institutions now commonly oppose proposed mergers endorsed
by the board of directors. They also increasingly engage in campaigns in support of shareholder
proposals. Finally, these provisions make it easy for hedge funds to coordinate their activities as
long as they stop short of forming a 13(d) “group.”98
Perhaps more to the point, some of the other governance changes discussed above will
create even more opportunities for making use of Rule 14a-2(b)(i). Specifically, the moves99 to
majority voting and annual elections of the entire board means that the opportunities for, and the
incentives to, engage in withhold campaigns increase. With annual elections, the opportunity for
a withhold campaign on a specific director arises every year, rather than once every three years
under staggered boards. And with majority voting, the result of sufficient withhold vote is that
the director is not elected or is required to offer to resign, rather than mere embarrassment under
plurality voting. Moreover, the ability of activists to threaten to engage in a withhold campaign
is greatly enhanced by the fact that such a campaign would fall under the Rule 14a-2(b)(i)
exceptions. This is especially true for activists that are viewed as cost-sensitive, such as mutual
funds or public pension funds. Thus, whatever the use of the Rule 14a-2(b)(i) is today, we think
it is likely that the use will increase significantly in the years ahead.

2.

The Probable End of Broker Discretionary Voting in Director Elections

Under long-standing practice, brokers may vote shares held in their accounts according to
their discretion when they do not receive specific instructions from the beneficial owners of
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these shares and when the matter is designated as “routine” by the New York Stock Exchange
(“broker non-votes” in the jargon of the trade).100
These discretionary broker votes have been a reliable and significant source of promanagement votes.101 Many individual shareholders, who tend to hold their shares in brokerage
accounts, do not bother to provide voting instructions and brokers have tended to use their
discretion to vote shares in accordance with the board’s recommendations.
In addition, historically, the NYSE has regarded uncontested director elections – that is,
elections where there is only one slate of nominees – as routine, even when some shareholders
waged an active campaign to convince other shareholders to “withhold” their votes from certain
nominees. For example, in 2004, 43% of the shares voted to withhold support from Disney’s
CEO Michael Eisner – a far from routine vote that may have forced him to resign. Brokers,
however, were permitted to cast the votes of uninstructed shares, and, according to some, if
broker votes had been ignored, Eisner would not have received majority support.102
The significance of discretionary broker votes has recently declined. First, as discussed
above, the percentage of shares held by individual investors – the type of investor most likely to
hold their shares in brokerage accounts and not to return a ballot103 – is steadily decreasing.
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Second, several brokers have recently moved from voting uninstructed shares in accordance with
the board recommendation to voting them in the same proportion as those shares in their
accounts for which they received voting instructions.104 On the other hand, voting is more
important than ever. With the rise of withhold-vote campaigns and, as discussed above,
majority voting for directors, an increasing number of director elections will likely become truly
non-routine, making the ability of brokers to vote more important.
Either way, however, discretionary broker votes in director elections may soon be gone.
In October 2006, the NYSE proposed to amend Rule 452 governing broker votes to redefine all
director elections as non-routine.105 The proposed change requires SEC approval to become
effective, but one wonders why the SEC would deny approval to a rule proposed by the NYSE
that would take away voting rights from persons who no one argues have any legitimate interest
in the outcome of the vote. If and when approved, brokers will lose their discretionary voting
authority for any director election.
An end of discretionary broker voting will obviously make it easier for withhold
campaigns to succeed. On non-routine shareholder proposals, broker non-votes amount on
average to 19% of the votes cast at an annual meeting.106 Until recently, a board could count on
brokers voting these shares in favor of its nominees. That would imply that, to get a majority
withhold vote, activists would have to get 62% of the instructed shares - a pretty steep task.
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Without broker non-votes, this task is much easier.

3. Notice and Access
Last year, the SEC enacted new rules governing the electronic delivery of proxy
materials.107 Under the rules, companies soliciting proxies may mail shareholders a short notice
providing some basic information about the issues to be voted on the annual meeting and
referring them to a website where the proxy statement and other solicitation materials are
available instead of furnishing the whole set of proxy materials.108 The “notice and
access”option is meant to reduce the cost of printing and mailing solicitation materials.
Importantly, the “notice and access” option is also made available to shareholders engaged in a
solicitation opposed by the company.
The “notice and access” option is especially important when shareholders cannot rely on
the Rule 14a-2(b)(i) exemption discussed above. Under that exemption, shareholders can
already engage in an effective proxy campaign without furnishing a proxy statement in support
of a shareholder proposal, in opposition to a board proposal, or to withhold votes for board
nominees to the board of directors. On these issues, the option to shareholders of making a
proxy statement available electronically is largely irrelevant.
Rule 14a-2(b), however, has its limitations. Most importantly, the exemption does not
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cover contests to elect a dissident slate to the board of directors.109 Right now, many such
contests tend to be full-blown campaigns – such as the Trian’s campaign against Heinz – often
conducted by a hedge fund or in the context of takeover bid. For full-fledged campaigns, the
printing and mailing savings from “notice and access” is likely immaterial.110 Thus, we do not
expect that “notice and access” will lead to a significant increase in the number of such contests.
Rather, the largest impact of the “notice and access” rule will likely lie in lower-key,
lower-cost, contests, probably for a “short slate” minority representation on the aboard. In such
contests, the costs savings resulting from not having to print and mail proxy statements may well
be significant.111
The campaigns in these lower-key election contests are likely to resemble the campaigns
currently waged in support of shareholder resolutions, in opposition to a board proposals, or to
withhold votes in favor of directors, which are now conducted in reliance on the Rule 14a-2(b)(i)
exemption.112 Unlike full-fledged campaigns, these campaigns are often run by cost-conscious
traditional institutional investors. The existence of such campaigns shows that there is some
demand by investors for activism that goes beyond making (or voting for) a mere shareholder
proposal under Rule 14a-8, but does not go as far as a full-fledged contest. “Notice and access”
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opens up a wider range of issues to these intermediate-intensity campaigns.113

4. The Uncertain – and Irrelevant – Fate of Proxy Access
One of the regulatory issues that seems never to go away is “proxy access.” Proxy
access refers to a requirement that a company include director candidates nominated by
shareholders in the company’s proxy statement. In 2003, the SEC approved a complex proposal
for rules on proxy access and solicited comments on the proposal. This proposal followed earlier
considerations of the issue – in 1942 and 1977 – which did not result in regulatory action.114
Under the proposal, proxy access was subject to a number of limitations. First, any
shareholder proxy access was conditioned on the prior occurrence of a “triggering event” –
specifically a 35% or more “withhold” vote for a person nominated as director by the board or a
majority vote in favor of a shareholder proposal (made by a shareholder holding at least 1% of
the company’s stock) electing to subject the company to proxy access. Second, any such proxy
access would be limited to two years after such a trigger had occurred. Third, in the two years
after a triggering event, only shareholders who held at least 5% of company’s stock continuously
for two years could obtain proxy access. Fourth, that shareholder could only nominate a
minority slate (1 to 3 directors, depending on the total board size).115
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When initially made, the proxy access proposal was supported by three of the five
commissioners: the Republican Chairman Donaldson and two Democratic commissioners.116
But the proposal elicited strong negative reactions from managerial interests, including the
Business Roundtable (an association of chief executive officers of leading U.S. companies) and
the Chamber of Commerce,117 and Donaldson’s support waned. When Donaldson resigned as
chairman in 2005,118 the practical effect was that the proposal, which has been lingering in limbo
for some time, was considered dead.
A hard battle had been fought between proponents and opponents of greater shareholder
rights, and the Business Roundtable had won – or so it seemed. Curiously, however, majority
voting for directors – which started spreading at about the time of Donaldson’s resignation and is
now in place in most S&P 100 companies119 – gives shareholders many of the same powers in a
more useful form.120 Most importantly, majority voting (like proxy access) gives shareholders
the power to “diselect” – and embarrass – a director from the board and the ability to do so
without having to file a proxy statement with the SEC. The credible threat of “diselecting” a
director gives shareholders leverage. With the pending change in NYSE rules on discretionary
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broker votes, shareholders can diselect a director with fewer votes than would have been
required under the proxy access proposals. Furthermore, while the proxy access proposal was
subject to limitations – a triggering event must have occurred in the prior two years, the
nominating shareholder must have owned 5% of the stock for two years, and only one to three
incumbents could be challenged – majority voting is not so constrained.
To be sure, majority voting differs from proxy access in that shareholders cannot pick the
director to replace the one they diselect. But we do not think that this is a major deficit. First
and foremost, shareholders will have a much easier time agreeing on diselecting a director than
agreeing both on rejecting a director candidate and on replacing her with a specific person. As a
result, majority voting gives shareholders a much more useful tool than proxy access. Moreover,
it is often the ability to remove an offensive director (and the ability to threaten such a removal),
rather than the ability to pick a replacement, that shareholders are really after. This is all the
more so because any shareholder nominees would have to have broad appeal to maximize their
chances of getting elected and would thus likely be drawn from the same pool of candidates as
regular directors.
And even if what shareholders really want is to elect someone of their choice to the
board, they have won half the battle. While the proxy access proposal would have spared
shareholders who wanted to conduct a proxy contests the costs of preparing, printing and mailing
a proxy statement. “Notice and access” saves shareholders printing and mailing costs (albeit not
preparation costs) and does so without any of the limitations that were part of the proxy access
proposal.
In any case, there is an aftermath. Like the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, the SEC could not
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control the forces it set in motion. The American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME) submitted its own home-made proposal for proxy access for inclusion in
the 2005 proxy statement of the American International Group under Rule 14a-8. The SEC’s
Division of Corporate Finance issued a no-action letter permitting AIG not to include the
proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(8) because it related to an election. In a stinging opinion issued in
September 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the SEC’s reasoning as
inconsistent with the SEC’s own prior interpretations of election exclusion and ruled that the
proposal could not be excluded.121 The SEC immediately announced that it would consider
amending Rule 14a-8 and that revisions to the rule would be finalized in time for the 2007 proxy
season. Despite this promise of speed, the SEC delayed action several times.122 On July 25,
2007, the SEC finally approved two separate proposals for public comments, each by a 3-2 vote
with the new chairman Cox once siding with the two other Republican commissioners and once
with the two Democrats. The first proposal would restate (and put on a firmer regulatory
footing) the SEC’s position rejected by the Second Circuit that shareholder proposals on proxy
access can be excluded under Rule 14a-8c). The second resembles the 2003 proposal that never
gained traction and would thus establish a form of proxy access for all companies.123 In
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November 2007, the SEC adopted the first position by a party-line 3-1 vote, one of the
Democratic commissioners having resigned in the interim.124 But lest this vote be mistaken as
closing the issue, SEC Chairman Cox announced that he hoped that the SEC would revisit proxy
access in 2008 and adopt a rule permitting some access.125

V. CHANGES IN THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
1. Listing Standards
In 2003, in the wake on the Enron scandal and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the New
York Stock Exchange (‘NYSE’) and the NASDAQ Stock Market adopted new governance rules
for listed companies.126 Both sets of rules now require boards of most companies127 to have a
majority of “independent” directors (albeit with somewhat varying definitions of
“independence”),128 to have an audit committee consisting entirely of independent directors129
and that the independent directors have regular separate meetings (“executive sessions”).130 The
NYSE rules further require that each board have a nominating/corporate governance and a
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compensation committee consisting entirely of independent directors.131 The NASDAQ rules do
not require boards to establish such committees, but if a company does establish a nominating or
a compensation committee, it must consist entirely of independent directors.132 The NASDAQ
rules do not address the composition of any separate corporate governance committee. Both set
of rules became effective in January 2004 for some companies, and later for others. And the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 itself requires, as of 2003, that each listed company have an audit
committee consisting entirely of independent directors.133

2. Nominal Board Independence
As Jeff Gordon as recently shown, the nominal independence of board members has
increased dramatically since the 1950s. Gordon estimates that the percentage of inside directors
has steadily decreased from 50% in 1950 to around 10% in 2005 and that the percentage of
independent directors has correspondingly increased from around 20% to around 80%.134
What is less clear, however, is whether there has been a significant change in board
make-up over the last 5 and 10 years and, if so, whether any change is attributable to the changed
listing requirements. Korn/Ferry, which conducts annual reviews of proxy statements of Fortune
1000 companies, reports that the average number of insiders on boards remained steady at 2
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between 1997 and 2006, while the average number of outsiders has declined from 9 to 8.135 It is,
of course, possible that these outsiders include fewer “grey” directors (who, albeit not employees
of the company, have a relationship that renders them non-independent). But we consider it
unlikely that any significant decline in the number of grey directors would not also be reflected
in the changed numbers of inside and outside directors.
Similarly, there appears to have been no change in the make-up of the key committees.
According to Korn/Ferry data, in each year between 1997 and 2006, neither audit, nor
compensation, nor nominating, nor corporate governance committees have had (on average) any
insider directors (the average number of outside directors on each committee varied between 3
and 4).136 Thus, both in terms of overall board composition and in terms of the composition of
key committees, there have been no recent changes and most companies have fulfilled the
requirements of the new 2004 listing standards for several years prior to their adoption.

3. Substantive Board Independence I: What do Boards Do?
One way to get a handle on whether boards have become more substantively independent
of the CEO is to examine what boards spend their time on. Specifically, boards that spend
relatively more time on monitoring the CEO are likely to be more substantively independent, and
the CEOs of companies with such boards are likely to be less powerful.
There are several useful metrics of what boards spent their time on. One important
measure is whether a board has established a committee devoted to certain tasks and how
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frequently that committee meets. Virtually all companies have had audit and compensation
committees for a significant period of time.137 But the number of companies with nominating
and corporate governance committees has increased significantly. According to Korn/Ferry, the
percentage of companies with nominating committees hovered in the low to mid-70s until 2002,
increased to 87% in 2003, and further increased to over 95% from 2004 on. The percentage of
companies with corporate governance committees (which are not regulated by NASDAQ
standards) gradually increased from 39% in 1997 to 48% in 2001, and then increased at a more
rapid rate to 54% in 2002, 72% in 2003, 90% in 2004, and 94% in 2005 and 2006.138 (See Figure
2). The changed NYSE and NASDAQ listing requirements presumably account for at least a
portion of this increase. Many companies, however, added these committees before they were
required to do so. The trend in corporate governance committees, not required by Sarbanes
Oxley or NASDAQ listing standards, and increasing even pre-SOX, suggests that a significant
portion of the increase may be unrelated to the changed standards.
Another interesting trend can be observed by looking at some other committees. The
three committees included in the Korn/Ferry data that relate to “management” – the executive
committee, the finance committee, and the investment committee – experienced a steady decline
in significance.139 (See Figure 3) By contrast, the one committee charged with monitoring
functions that is not affected by the changed listing standards – the succession committee –
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experienced a steady (if slow) increase from 31% in 1997 to 39% in 2006.140
Another indicator of whether these committees serve as window dressing or whether they
perform important functions is the number of times they meet. As Table 5 indicates, the number
of meetings of committees with monitoring functions – the audit, compensation, nominating,
corporate governance, and succession committees – has generally increased.141 With the
exception of the audit committees, this increase does not seem to be due to an increased burden
placed on these committees by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Rather, the number of meetings
increased at approximately the same rate in the pre-Sarbanes Oxley period (1997 - 2001) as in
the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period (2001 - 2006). The numbers of meetings of the committees with
management functions – executive, finance and investment – have remained steady.142
We also examined the compensation received by board members for serving on various
committees. As a measure of compensation, we used the retainer received by the committee
chair because cash compensation levels for that measure were available for each committee in
most years.143 Between 1996 and 2001, compensation for committee service adjusted for
inflation barely budged. (See Figure 4). Average compensation (adjusted for inflation) changed
by less than 1% per year for all committees combined, all committees but the audit committee,
the audit committee, the four other monitoring committees, and the three management
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committees. But between 2001 and 2006, the picture is starkly different. Compensation for the
chair of the audit committee increased on average by 18% a year – unsurprising given the
additional responsibilities resulting from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. But compensation for the four
other monitoring committees also increased, by a respectable average of 11% a year; while
compensation for the three management committees increased by only 5% a year.144
These changes indicate a shift in what the board is doing. Rather than help the corporate
insider with managing the business of the corporation, boards are now increasingly engaged in
monitoring managements and planning for management changes.
Some other data in the Korn/Ferry survey provide additional evidence that outside
directors work harder. Survey responses indicate that, between 1997 and 2003, the monthly
numbers of hours worked increased from 13 to 19. In 2004 and 2005, when Korn/Ferry instead
asked whether the board had more meetings than in the prior year, 29% and 34%, respectively,
responded yes.145

4. Substantive Board Independence II: Changed Board Dynamics
Over the last few years, boardroom dynamics have changed, with outside directors
emerging as a power center independent of CEOs. Until recently, outside directors never met
without the CEO present and received most of their information from management. This insider
control of the information flow to and among outside directors has ceased. Nowadays, it is not
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unusual for directors to meet with significant shareholders and even with employees.146 In some
instances, they even hire outside consultants to review business plans presented by
management.147 In addition, since 2004, outside directors are required by stock exchange rules
to meet in “executive sessions” outside the presence of the CEO. According to reports, directors
who fear the company is heading off course use these meetings to reinforce each others’ concern
and settle on a plan of action – including, on occasion, a plan to fire the CEO.148
Responses in the Korn/Ferry survey confirm this change in board dynamics. Thus, the
percentage of boards with a formal process for evaluating CEOs increased from the high 60s in
1997 and 2001 to around 90% in 2006. In addition, the percentage of boards with a lead outside
director (if the CEO is also the chairman) increased from around 30% up to 2002 to around 80%
in 2006. According to another annual survey conducted by the Business Roundtable, 90% of
companies had an independent chairman, lead director or presiding director in 2007 (up from
83% in 2005 and 71% in 2004).149
The latter increase could be attributable to the requirement that independent directors
meet in executive sessions. Though there is no requirement for a lead director, a board may find
it useful to appoint a lead director to run these meetings. But we think more is going on. For
one, the percentage of respondents who said that companies should have lead outside director
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increased from 55% in 2001 to 84% in 2006.150 Second, the percentage of companies with a lead
director out of those that conduct executive sessions increased from 34% in 1997 to 78% in 2001
to 83% in 2006.151 This indicates that the increase in lead directors is not merely a pragmatic
adjustment to the regulatory change, but reflects a change in the board attitude that a greater
dispersion of power – away from the CEO and towards the independent directors – is desirable
or at least required.
Finally, the standard US practice of having the CEO also serve as Chairman of the Board
seems to be eroding. According to the Business Roundtable Survey, the percentage of
companies that had split the CEO and Chairman position increased from 4% in 2004, to 9% in
2005, to 11% in 2006, to 13% in 2007.152 And our own review of S&P 100 companies indicates
that the percentage of companies with split positions increased from 18% in 2003 to 26% in
2006.
Perhaps the most telling indicator that boardroom dynamics have changed is the annual
list of “Key Issues for Directors” prepared by Martin Lipton. In 2006, the number one item on
the list was “Anticipating Attacks by activist hedge funds ...”153 In 2007, attacks by activist
hedge fund had dropped to number seven (of nine) and a new entry headed the list: “Maintaining
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collegiality and the culture of common enterprise with the CEO and senior management ...”154

5. Substantive Board Independence III: CEO Turnover
As another indicator for the greater substantive independence of the board of directors,
CEO tenure is declining. According to a recent report prepared by Booz Allen Hamilton,
directors are “becoming more critical ... and are far more likely to insist that CEOs deliver
acceptable shareholder returns.”155 Importantly, Booz Allen finds that boards are increasingly
prepared to replace CEOs in anticipation of disappointing future performance, rather than in
response to poor past performance. For 2006, total turnover (which includes turnover due to
retirement, dismissal and acquisition) was 14.3%. Among the other specific finding, Booz Allen
reports that, between 1995 and 2006, annual turnover of CEOs had increased by 59% and
performance-related turnover by 318%. Correspondingly, the fraction of CEOs who were forced
from office increased from 1/8 to nearly 1/3.
A study by Steve Kaplan and Bernadette Minton arrives at similar conclusions.156 Kaplan
and Minton find a total takeover rate (including both external (take-over related) and internal
(non takeover-related) turnover) of 16.45% and an internal takeover rate of 12.83% for 1998 2005, which corresponds to an average CEO tenure period of as low as six years. This period,
the authors say, is substantially shorter than the ones reported in previous work for the 1970s,
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1980s, and 1990s. They conclude that boards respond more broadly to poor performance than
they had in the past and monitor more frequently and aggressively.
In our analysis of S&P 100 companies, we found that, of 96 companies that had not been
acquired between March 2006 and March 2008, 19 had a turnover in CEOs. (This corresponds
to a somewhat lower internal takeover rate than reported in the study above, which may be due
to the fact that CEOs of S&P 100 companies are less inclined than CEOs of smaller companies
to leave for a different position.) Of these 19 changes, one can be classified as a promotion
(Goldman Sachs’ CEO became Secretary of the Treasury), and 9 (based on press reports) as
involuntary. The remainder are claimed to be retirements. Using the academic convention of
and treating a “retirement” of a CEO who is 60 or older as voluntary and a “retirement” of a
CEO under 60 as forced (unless the reported reason is health), a total of 12 changes can be
classified as involuntary. Thus, our sample yields a somewhat higher estimate for involuntary
turnover, both absolutely and as a fraction of total turnover, than the Booz Allen study.

VI. Executive Compensation: The Final Frontier
1. Enhanced Disclosure
In July 2006, the SEC adopted new and enhanced disclosure requirements for executive
compensation.157 The new rules expand the previous disclosure regime in several ways. First,
proxy statement must contain a new section “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” with a
narrative discussion of objectives, design of compensation program, and how the company
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determines the amount of various compensation elements.158 Second, more information is
required for stock options and retirement benefits, including the fair value of these options on the
date of the grant.159 Third, an enhanced summary compensation table must provide a dollar
value for each compensation item as well as elements for total compensation.160 The last
requirement, in particular, makes it harder to camouflage compensation by shifting it into
categories that need not be quantified.161 Prior to the 2006 reforms, the reported figure for “total
compensation” did not include the value of stock awards, option grants and retirement benefits.
And although some information on these items was disclosed elsewhere in the proxy statement,
it was hard to decipher their dollar value. Thus, for example, GE reported that its CEO Jeffrey
Immelt received “total compensation” of $3.4 million in 2005, that he was also granted 430,000
performance stock units (PSUs) in 2005, and that he held PSUs and restricted stock with a value
of $45.7 million as of December 31, 2005; but it did not disclose either the fair value of the PSUs
granted in 2005 nor the total compensation including these PSUs for 2005.162 For 2006 (postreform), GE disclosed that Immelt received total compensation of $17.9 million, a figure that
includes stock and option awards valued at $8 million and increases in pension value of $1
million.163
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2. Say on Pay
The latest shareholder rights initiative goes by the poetic label “say on pay.”164 “Say on
pay” would require a company to give its shareholders a non-binding, advisory vote on the
compensation of its executives. This could have serious ramifications. The combination of
traditional institutional investors with various performance or governance gripes, union-affiliated
pension funds that may be willing to campaign for a “say NO on pay” vote, and populist
sentiments against executives whose pay, as a multiple of average worker salary, has risen
steadily – together with the disclosure requirements that make it harder to “camouflage”
executive compensation – means that many CEOs could find their packages disapproved by
shareholders. Moreover, given the recent trend of boards to heed shareholders requests,165 even
an advisory vote could be a significant threat to CEO pocketbooks. Unsurprisingly, management
lawyers like Martin Lipton recommend that such votes be “strongly resisted.”166
A bill mandating “say on pay” for all public companies was passed by the House of
Representatives in April 2008,167 but has so far not progressed in the Senate. Perhaps more
importantly, the SEC has ruled that shareholder proposals requesting boards to adopt “say on
pay” are not excludable under Rule 14a-8.168 According to ISS, the number of such proposals
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has sky-rocketed from 0 in 2005, 7 in 2006, 41 in 2007, to at least 76 in 2008169 – the single most
numerous category of proposals for that year.170
Shareholder support for these proposal is high – the average proposal received 41.7% in
2007 – but not nearly as high as support for proposals to destagger (63.9% support) or to adopt
majority voting (50.3% support).171 Of 38 such proposal for which results were reported by
Georgeson, only 2 (at Ingersoll-Rand and Motorola) garnered a majority of the votes cast.172
This partly explains why these proposals are so numerous. When proposals to destagger a board
or to adopt majority voting, which shareholders regularly adopt, are introduced, companies often
agree to make the requested changes without a shareholder vote and thus remove the proposal
from the ballot. But because boards have a high chance of defeating a “say on pay” proposal,
they have less of an incentive to adopt “say on pay” on their own.
So far. The problem for boards – and CEOs, who would presumably be most affected by
“say on pay” votes – is that for new types of shareholder proposals, the percentage of shares
voted in favor and the number of proposals introduced tends to increase over time. Thus, for
example, support for majority vote proposals, also of relatively recent vintage, increased from
11% (on 12 proposals) in 2004, to 44% (on 54) in 2005, to 48% (on 84) in 2006, to 50% (on 37)
in 2007. For shareholder proposals for “say on pay,” the number of proposals and, to a lesser
extent, the support they garner (no proposal in 2005, 40% on 7 proposals in 2006, 41% on 41
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proposals in 2007, 42% on 76 proposals in 2008), seems to follow a similar pattern.173 Morever,
signs are that the board front against “say on pay” is starting to break. In 2008, Aflac Inc.
became the first company to hold an advisory “say on pay” vote, apparently without any
shareholder pressure.174 Verizon Communications, where a 2007 proposal received slightly
more “for” than “against” votes (but less than majority support), and Blockbuster, where the
proposal received majority support, decided to adopt “say on pay” for 2009.175 And Pfizer and
several other large companies have formed a working group with union officials to discuss
adoption of say on pay.176

3. Actual Compensation
Actual executive compensation may present the final frontier in the erosion of CEO
dominance. Many commentators believe that CEOs, through their influence over the board,
essentially set their own pay.177 Even if one does not subscribe to the more extreme versions of
the theory, which accords a minimal role to market forces in setting CEO pay, compensation is
surely important for CEOs and CEOs can be expected to use the levers of power they have to
notch up the amount they earn. Thus, if we are right and CEOs have lost power, we may expect
that the decline in power has, or will soon have, an adverse impact on their compensation.
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However, as discussed below, other factors may push it in the opposite direction and make it
difficult to predict the effect of a loss on power on compensation.

VII. THE EFFECTS OF THESE CHANGES ON CEO POWER
In the previous pages, we’ve summarized a large number of changes in the relationships
between CEOs, boards and shareholders. In this section, we analyze how these changes affect
CEO power, using our earlier taxonomy.
a.

Decision-making : Decisions and Agenda Control

Consider the single most important decision in the life of a company: whether to sell
control. In a world of dispersed shareholdings – think back to the 1950s and 1960s – this was a
decision in the first instance for the CEO, possibly with the advice of the board of directors.178 A
CEO who determined that it was a good time to sell the company or to buy another company
would reasonably expect that decision to carry the day, even if the particular form of corporate
combination required board and shareholder approval. Likewise, a CEO who decided that it was
not a good time to sell had reasonable grounds for assuming that the decision would end
discussion.
In today’s world of activist hedge funds, more independent directors and assertive
shareholders, that is clearly no longer true. How does it play out today? First, the changes in
shareholder composition and activism means that shareholding is far more concentrated, and
concentrated in the hands of shareholders – hedge funds and more traditional institutional
shareholders – who are more willing to challenge a CEO’s decision than ever before. Such

178

See, generally, Myles Mace, Directors: Myth & Reality (1971).

51

challenges are becoming easier than ever to mount because the decline of staggered boards, the
rise of majority voting for directors, and the ever increasing success of shareholder proposals,
means that shareholders have far more opportunities to hold directors accountable for their
deference to the CEO. Moreover, the 1992 partial deregulation of the proxy rules, combined
with the probable end of broker non-votes, and the adopting of e-proxy means that the costs of
challenging the CEO’s decision have been markedly reduced. All this takes place against the
backdrop of directors who, as a result of Sarbanes-Oxley driven stock exchange reforms in
listing standards, are both formally and substantively more independent than ever before.
A decision by the CEO to sell or not to sell the company – as, say, PeopleSoft CEO Craig
Conway learned – is therefore but the beginning of the conversation.179 And, because all the
players know that the rules of the game have changed, some conversations do not even start. In
today’s environment, a decision by the CEO to sell the company to a favored bidder over a
competing bidder offering more is doomed from the outset.
Equally dramatically, the CEO has largely lost control over the agenda to the
shareholders. The changes summarized above combine to eliminate the CEO’s ability to keep
matters off the corporate agenda. With hedge funds and more traditional institutional
shareholders willing to agitate in favor of proposals on the issuer’s proxy under 14a-8, or pursue
matters directly in their own proxy solicitations, with the costs of such solicitations declining
because of regulation and technology, and with increasing success in passing and implementing
such proposals, CEO agenda control has been limited if not eliminated. In case after case,
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shareholders have proved themselves capable of forcing unwanted topics onto the front burner.
These examples of loss of CEO decision-making powers are the most visible tips of an
iceberg. In several other areas, our analysis suggest, CEO decision-making power has also
declined. These include, in particular, the areas delegated to the responsibility of wholly
independent board committee: audit, compensation, and nomination. How much else of the
iceberg is hidden under water is hard to tell. Presumably, board members still generally defer to
the CEO when it comes to operational decisions (or else decide to fire the CEO). By the same
token, CEOs probably involve board members more in major strategic decisions (if only to make
sure that they are on board if the decision does not work out as planed). And anecdotal evidence
suggests that “friendly” hedge funds – who do not engage in adversarial activism – share their
views about major business decisions with the CEO. Thus, it is likely that CEO decision-making
power has declined significantly with respect to some key issues and more moderately over a
wider set of issues, with both large shareholders and independent directors gaining power at the
expense of CEOs.
b.

Second Guessing

Though CEOs have some power to make decisions, it is in the aspect of second-guessing
where their loss of power is most notable. In matters that to not constitute major strategic or
governance decisions, the rise of active shareholders and independent directors does not seem to
have affected the CEO’s ability to direct action within the firm. Here, CEOs still reign supreme.
But CEOs who become entangled in scandals, who consume excessive perks,180 or who are not
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responsive to shareholders or boards, are more likely to face repercussions.
What has changed, then, more than anything else, is the ability and incentives for other
players to second guess the CEO’s actions. Consider first a CEO who acts imperiously in regard
to selling the company. If this decision was once considered the final word, it no longer is. In
today’s environment, one would expect hedge funds to buy shares in order to challenge the
decision. Thus, when Yahoo’s CEO Jerry Yang cold-shouldered an offer by Microsoft to
acquire the company, it did not take long for Carl Icahn to commence a proxy contest and place
three nominees on Yahoo’s board.181 More generally, the evidence we presented indicates that if
a CEO makes mistakes (or perhaps just has bad luck), both shareholders and directors will voice
their criticism sooner and more strongly and in the days of yore, be it informally, through a
proxy challenge or another activist campaign, or through a board-induced CEO resignation.
c.

The Scope of CEO Power: Extension, Comprehensiveness, and Intensity

As noted earlier, CEO power can also be divided along the dimensions of extension,
comprehensiveness, and intensity. Extension essentially relates to the scale of the firm. Since
firms have not gotten smaller, and since CEOs remain to be on top of the firm, CEO power has
not declined along that dimension. In terms of comprehensiveness – the number of topics over
which power is exercised – and intensity – the degree to which the holder of power can impose
his or her will – CEO power has declined. As noted before, the decline is most pronounced (that
is, the decline is sharpest along the dimension of intensity) in areas which require board or
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shareholder approval, such as decisions to sell the firm, audit matters, compensation, corporate
governance, and board nominations. In other areas, we believe CEO power has declined as well,
but due to the lack of transparency over how these decisions are made and whether they are
second-guessed, it is harder to document the decline. Morever, since independent directors and
even activist shareholders have limited capacity to micro-manage a company, it is likely that
CEOs still have substantial decision-making power over most non-strategic business matters, as
long as their decisions produce acceptable results.

VIII. IMPLICATIONS
1. Fundamental Shift or Perfect Storm?
Some observers, noting some of the issues we discussed in the preceding part, have
characterized the current state of affairs as a “perfect storm.”182 The perfect storm metaphor
evokes a temporary and accidental alignment of forces that creates a special situation or
opportunity.183 But like other storms, perfect ones ultimately pass and the situation returns to
normal.
We do not think this captures what is happening. The changes we discuss are not
temporary and their simultaneous occurrence is not accidental. Any changes in the regulatory
environment – including the changes in proxy rules, the revised listing standards in the stock
exchange rules, and (if it happens) the elimination of broker voting in uncontested director
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elections – are likely to persist. The shift in equity ownership from individuals to institutions
reflects fundamental long-term change forces184 and will continue. Companies who have agreed
to destagger the board are unlikely to receive shareholder approval to reintroduce a staggered
board.185 And while most companies that have adopted majority voting could return to plurality
voting without shareholder approval,186 we think this is both unlikely and ultimately ineffective:
even under a plurality vote regime, a director who receives a majority “withhold” votes faces
enormous pressures to resign.
These changes, in turn, have caused some of the other changes we observe. To be
successful, activist hedge funds need allies, and institutional investors with their increased
holdings are likely candidates. Successful hedge fund activism has led traditional institutions
first to lend their active support to hedge funds, and then to lead the charge themselves. The rise
in institutional holdings has generated demand for voting advice by proxy advisors. The
destaggering of boards and majority voting has increased the meaningfulness and the frequency
of director elections. That directors are up for election more frequently, that they are worried
about a large “withhold” vote, and that ignoring shareholder proposals is a sure way to increase
the withhold vote,187 is at least part of reason why boards have become more responsive to
shareholder resolutions. This, in turn, means that more companies will destagger, adopt majority
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voting, or even give shareholders a “say on pay.” Independent nominating and governance
committees reduce the ability of CEOs to stop this. Increased holdings by institutions and fear
of hedge funds increases both the demand by shareholders to meet with outside directors and the
willingness of directors to do so. Directors meeting in executive session creates the opportunity
to discuss company developments unmonitored by the CEOs. As more boards question their
CEOs, it becomes more acceptable for directors in other companies to do so. Greater substantive
independence and greater pressure from shareholders, in turn, increases CEO turnover.
Increased turnover means that, at any point of time, there will be more members of the board
who have picked the CEO than members who were picked for the board during the CEO’s
tenure. Thus, even if CEOs continue to influence the selection of board members, despite the
requirement for wholly independent nominating committees, shorter tenure implies less CEO
influence over board membership. And we could go on.
We are not so bold to claim that all the trends we described will continue unabated. But
we think that it is much more likely that CEOs, in the intermediate term (over the next 10 years
or so) will lose more power than that they will regain some of the power they have lost.

2.

Backlash

If we are correct and the changes we discuss presage a continuing decline in the power of
CEOs, rather than a cyclical and self-reversing shift, there is the possibility of a political
backlash. Such a backlash, in the form of state anti-takeover statutes and Delaware’s sanctioning
of the poison pill, helped stop the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s, the last significant threat to
managerial power. These days, advocates of managerialism already argue that the increased
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power of shareholders and decreased board collegiality induces an excessive short-term
orientation that harms US competitiveness.
While the possibility of backlash cannot be excluded, we believe that its likelihood is
remote. Unlike in the 1980s, the threat to managers derives from multiple sources – traditional
institutions, hedge funds, proxy advisors, technology, and their fellow directors – rather than
from a small group of raiders. And compared to raiders of the 1980s, who were in many respects
outsiders,188 even hedge funds (a fortiori institutional investors and board members) are part of
(or well connected to) the establishment and have significant political power. The threat to
managers is more gradual and broad-based than in the 1980s, and thus less likely to result in a
strong response. Finally, there is little reason to expect populist support for pro-management
changes: organized labor, who supported anti-takeover legislation in the 1980s, is lined up
against management in this round.189

3.

Board Composition

The shift of power from CEOs to outside board members also has implications for the
type of persons who will serve on corporate boards. Compared to outside directors 10 years ago,
outside directors today are likely to have more power, to enjoy a less collegial relationship to the
insiders, to have a greater workload, to earn a greater pay, to have occasional need to become
confrontational, and to deal with vocal and restive shareholders. Accordingly, board
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composition will shift to persons who are good at these new tasks, who derive greater enjoyment
for them, and who have the needed time and energy to devote to the job.
One category of persons who may be particularly well qualified for board service in the
current environment are retired CEOs and other retired high level executives, bankers,
accountants, consultants, or investment professionals. They tend to have both the time, the
background, the independence, and the interest to perform the tasks set to them. We would
predict that, over time, the percentage of board members from these categories will increase.

4.

Shareholder “Flavor of the Year” Initiatives

Shareholder resolutions often come in waves, with every year or so witnessing the
emergence of a new “flavor of the year” type of precatory resolution and the decline of some
prior types. For 2008, professionals predict a significant rise in “say on pay” resolutions. In
prior years, we saw a wave on resolutions on confidential voting, poison pill rescissions,
performance-based options, etc.
Management’s response has largely been to duck and hope for the storm to pass before
the topic gained sufficient traction to generate real pressure for change. This tactics looks
increasingly untenable. First, with the rise of institutional investors, it takes less time for a new
proposal to gain significant shareholder support. Second, once a proposal has received (or is
expected to receive) support, boards are increasingly willing to adopt the recommendation. We
would thus predict more success of shareholder initiatives, which in turn will lead to more
initiatives. The vote and company response on “say on pay” resolutions over the next few proxy
cycles will be an early test for our prediction.
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5.

Convergence

Much ink has been spilled on the question of whether corporate law and governance
systems in different countries are converging.190 Our evidence suggest that we may be
witnessing the end of a particular exceptionalism in U.S. corporate governance: the imperial
CEO. In many respects, the changes we discussed in this article, while new from the U.S.
perspective, have long been part of the corporate governance regime in other Anglo-American
countries, such as the UK, Canada and Australia. Thus, for example, most UK companies have a
non-executive chairman of the board and UK law gives shareholders a non-binding “say on
pay.”191 Poison pills are not permitted under Australian law.192 Under Canadian law, directors
of a company with a classified board can be removed without cause, making this device an
ineffective takeover defense. As US practice moves closer to the practice of these other
countries, both with regard to specific issues and with regard to the overall power of the CEO,
the corporate law regimes are converging.

6.

Resistance to Acquisition

If we are right, being CEO of a public company has become less fun. You get to call
fewer shots, you are being second-guessed by boards and shareholders, and your job security has
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decreased. All of this will make CEOs more willing to let their company be acquired and cash in
on appreciated stock options or severance payments. CEO resistance to acquisitions should thus
decline.
On the other hand, boards and shareholders may be the ones to offer roadblocks. Boards
may get more involved in the negotiations of acquisition terms, and may reject offers that the
CEO may want to accept. And we have already witnessed instances of shareholders trying to
renegotiate a deal struck by management.193 Board and shareholder resistance to acquisitions –
which, until recently, was negligible – should thus increase.
In related work, we document the divergence in financial incentives to engage in control
transactions between the CEO and independent directors.194 While today’s CEOs have strong
monetary incentives to support a change in control, especially as they approach the end of their
tenure,195 for outside directors it is a losing proposition. While outside directors are able to sell
any shares they have for a premium, these gains are dwarfed by the loss of the very substantial
director fees. Moreover, such directors are typically not able to replace their lost directorship
with another of comparable status.
These changes, in turn, may impact Delaware law on acquisitions. First, Delaware law
on hostile takeovers and, in particular, the “just say no” defense, will become less important. By
the same token, Delaware law on the ability of boards to “lock up” deals in the absence of a
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bidding contest could become more important.196 More profoundly, Delaware law rests to some
extent on the premise that shareholders want to sell the company at a premium, and management
wants to block the sale and stay independent.197 If this premise becomes increasingly incorrect,
Delaware law will have to adapt the substantive standard by which it evaluates transactions.

7.

The Need for Greater Shareholder Voting Rights

Recently, our colleague Lucian Bebchuk has argued that shareholder voting rights should
be expanded to include the power, without board approval, to change the company’s governance
structure (including the power to change the charter and to reincorporate into a different state)
and to make certain specific business decisions (such as the power to instruct the board to
auction the company to the highest bidder).198 The premise of Bebchuk’s argument is that, even
though shareholders elect the board of directors, and thus indirectly already control all of these
decision, this indirect control is not enough because directors do not heed shareholder wishes.
Predictably, other commentators have ridden to the defense of the current system where the
board retain greater control.199
The evidence we present in this article suggests that, whatever the merits of Bebchuk’s
proposal when it was conceived, the need for (and desirability of) any reform suggested by

196

In practice, Delaware law addresses lock ups only in the context of competing bids.

197

Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)..

198

See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules 119 Harv L Rev 1784 (2006); Lucian A.
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power 118 Harv L Rev 833 (2005).
199

Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 Harv L Rev 1735
(2006); Leo E. Strine, Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for
Improving Corporate America, 119 Harv L Rev 1759 (2006).

62

Bebchuk has declined. Bebchuk and his detractors fundamentally differ with respect to one
major issue: when shareholders and the board of director take different position with respect to a
matter – such as whether the charter should be amended in a certain way or the company should
be auctioned off – who is more likely to be right? Both sides to the debate, however, would
presumably agree that boards are more likely to heed shareholder wishes if they believe that
what shareholders want is good, or at least is not bad, (or at least not very bad), for the company.
That is, the merits of what shareholders want and the likelihood of boards following a nonbinding shareholder vote, are correlated.
In the ideal corporate governance world, board would retain just that modicum of power
that permits them to block, at the margin, more bad ideas than good ideas. In the real world, of
course, board power cannot be fine-tuned in that manner. As a formal matter, a board can either
block certain types of decisions, or they cannot. Bebchuk, in effect, argues that we would be
better off if boards could not block governance changes and certain business decisions. Others
argue that we are better off if they can.
As we have shown in this article, however, even though the formal powers of the board
have not changed, boards have become much more receptive to shareholders. For example,
boards have become more likely to implement non-binding resolutions that receive majority
shareholder support. Thus, boards voluntarily, albeit selectively, implement more shareholderproposed governance changes. This obviously reduces the need for removing board veto power
over governance changes, as proposed by Bebchuk. But if, as is likely, from among all the
governance changes desired by a majority of shareholders, the governance changes implemented
by boards are better than those rejected by boards, it may also mean that the time for Bebchuk’s
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proposal has passed. Even if we would be better off with letting shareholders set the rules than
with giving veto right to boards when boards regularly ignored what shareholders want, we may
be better off with board veto than with unfettered shareholder rights to set the rules when boards
implement a significant portion of non-binding proposals passed by shareholders.

8.

Private Equity to the Rescue?: the trade off between power and wealth

As remarkable as the growth in hedge funds may have been, it is not unparalleled. The
funds raised by private equity firms in the U.S. have experienced a growth rate – 23%, annually
compounded, from 1999 to 2006 – as high as the hedge fund assets under a management (19%
during that period).200 The total dollar volume of private equity M&A transactions in 2006 was
$900 billion, a magnitude comparable to the total hedge fund assets ($1,427 billion), especially
considering that a significant portion of hedge fund assets are not invested in equity securities.201
Moreover, at least until the recent credit crunch, private equity funds played an
increasingly large role in M&A. As a percentage of total M&A dollar volume, private equity
M&A has grown from less than 5% in 1999 to more than 25% in 2006. In 2006, there were 151
going-private transactions sponsored by private equity funds, up from only 67 in 2000.202
Private equity, like hedge funds, are significant new players. On the one hand, private
equity, which rarely if ever engages in hostile transactions, empower CEOs by offering a safe
harbor in a storm, by expanding CEO’s options and opportunities, and, when taking companies
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private, by offering the possibility of great wealth. On the other hand, private equity, as an
institution, weakens CEOs by increasing the likelihood of a change of control, by closely
monitoring their investments in public companies, and by tightly controlling portfolio companies
(setting and monitoring goals; firing underperfoming CEOs).
So, while having one’s company acquired by a private equity firm may make an CEO
rich, his power is reduced. When a company is acquired, the CEO either leaves the firm or stays
on to manage the firm, which is now a portfolio company in a private equity fund. In the former
case, the CEO gives up any power that comes with the job. In the latter case, the CEO now has a
boss – the management of the private equity firm – which has the ability and the incentives to
monitor him and to fire him if they are dissatisfied. Whatever financial rewards the CEO may
obtain in his new position, one thing is clear: the power of a CEO of a company owned by a
private equity fund is much less than the power of a CEO of a comparable company that is
publicly traded.
CEOs, like other people, have complex motivations. Money is nice but so is power and
prestige. Successful lawyers give up substantial income to become (poorly paid) judges.
Successful businessmen spend vast sums to achieve (unremunerative) elective office.203 But the
substitution effect can run the other way as well: CEOs who have lost power may find the
possibility of great wealth offered by private equity relatively more attractive.
Moreover, to the extent that we are right that the changes in CEO power are here to stay,
203
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we predict that public companies, to keep successful CEOs who have the option to move to
private companies, will have to pay more. To the extent that power and money are substitutes,
the decline in power predicts an increase in monetary compensation.

CONCLUSION: SEARCHING FOR THE SWEET SPOT
The story we tell above is a story of declining CEO power, a decline that has occurred
across almost all of the relevant dimensions. Is this a good thing?
One of the great virtues of the corporate form is centralized management.204 Much of
corporate law can be interpreted as establishing and protecting that centralized management
because of the benefits that it provides to the participants in the firm. At the same time, the
centralization of management in the hands of paid managers creates the shareholder-manager
agency costs, the prevention of which forms such an important part of corporate law.
There is, for a given firm operating in a specific environment, a point at which the net
benefits of delegation are maximized. The difficulty is that it is very difficult to know whether
we are at that point.
In this article, we argue that the balance of power between CEOs, boards and
shareholders has shifted dramatically in the last decade in favor of shareholders. We expect that
the shift will continue in the same direction, leaving CEOs ever more embattled, at least in
comparison to their predecessors a generation ago. But we cannot claim, and do not know,
whether the balance has shifted too far, whether under current conditions the CEO is not
powerful enough. On the other hand, those arguing to strip the CEO of even more power also
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cannot show that the CEO of today is too powerful.
As we search for the sweet spot, it is worth keeping in mind that for every story about a
domineering CEO who should have been replaced long ago, there is an Andrew Grove or a Jack
Welch who used the power of the position to make billions of dollars for their shareholders.
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Table 1: Percent Ownership of Equities by Types of Investor

Households
Private
Pension
Funds
Public
Pension
Funds
Mutual Funds
All
Institutions

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
84
78
70
68
54
56
6
8
13
16
23
17

1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
52
46
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38
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12
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13
13
13
13
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Figure 1: Advisor References per Year
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Table 2: Staggered Boards in S&P 100 Companies

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Companies with
Staggered Boards
44
41
34
25
21
16

New
Adoptions

Eliminations

Eliminated as % of
Companies having SB

3
7
8
5

6.8%
17.1%
23.5%
24.0%

0
0
0
0

Table 3: Majority Voting in S&P 100 Companies

Majority
Voting

2003
10

2004
9

2005
9

2006
51

2007
81

2008
84

Table 4: Shareholder Proposals (S&P 1500)

Adopted
Proposals
Implemented
Proposals
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Proposals
Implementation
Percentage
Ignored

2001
25
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2006
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Figure 2: Percentage of Companies with Board Committee
Audit, Compensation, Nominating, and Corporate Governance
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Succession, Executive, Finance, and Investment

70
60
50
Succession
Executive
Finance
Investment

40
30
20
10
0
1997

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Table 5: Committee Meetings per Year
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Figure 4: Committee Compensation Trends
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